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 1 
Asset Recovery at International(ised) Criminal Tribunals: Fines, Forfeiture, and 
Orders for Reparations 
 




International(ised) criminal tribunals (ICTs) have traditionally had two tools at their 
disposal with which to recover assets, whether ill-gotten or otherwise, belonging to 
persons convicted of international crimes: fines and orders for forfeiture as penalties 
additional to imprisonment. However, following the establishment of the permanent 
International Criminal Court (ICC), increasingly victim-oriented ICTs have been 
equipped with a third tool for asset recovery in international crimes cases: orders for 
reparations. This tool provides a vehicle through which victims of international crimes 
might be awarded compensation, among other forms of reparation.  
 
This chapter critically analyses the availability and use of these three asset recovery 
mechanisms at ICTs from Nuremberg until the post-ICC era. It will be shown that, 
while the majority of ICTs have been empowered to order fines and forfeiture measures, 
such procedures have been scarcely utilised in practice. An additional aim of the chapter 
is to show that the Rome Statute system has influenced the approach toward fines, 
forfeiture (including protective measures), and orders for reparations taken by a number 
of ICTs established following its adoption in 1998.  
 
2. The Post-World War II Military Tribunals 
 
The International Military Tribunal (IMT) was explicitly empowered to order asset 
forfeiture measures. However, although Article 28 of the IMT Charter afforded the 
Tribunal ‘the right to deprive the convicted person of any stolen property and order its 
delivery to the Control Council for Germany’,1 this provision was never utilised by the 
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Judges sitting in Nuremberg.2 The Tribunal found the accused Alfred Rosenberg guilty 
of war crimes and crimes against humanity based in part upon his ‘responsib[ility] for 
a system of organized plunder of both public and private property throughout the 
invaded countries of Europe’,3 but it made no orders for restitution against him or other 
convicted persons under Article 28 of the IMT Charter.4 
 
Conversely, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) had no such 
explicit power. The IMTFE Charter contains no comparable provision to Article 28 of 
the IMT Charter, despite the fact that these two ICTs’ constituent instruments share 
several common elements, including with regard to punishment. 
 
As for fines, although neither ICT was explicitly granted the power by its constituent 
instrument to order fines, it has been suggested that Article 27 of the IMT Charter and 
Article 16 of the IMTFE Charter did not exclude the possibility of the imposition of 
financial penalties. 5  These near-verbatim provisions conferred upon the IMT and 
IMTFE the power to impose upon a convicted person ‘death or such other punishment 
as shall be determined by it to be just.’6 Although perhaps more likely to refer to ‘the 
most serious forms of punishment, such as imprisonment’,7 Article 27 of the IMT 
Charter could arguably have allowed for the imposition of fines by the IMT. Further, 
Article 16 of the IMTFE Charter could have enabled the IMTFE to order fines as well 
as asset forfeiture measures akin to those provided for in Article 28 of the IMT Charter. 
In other words, the main focus was on the death penalty or imprisonment, and if fines 
had ever been in question, the two military tribunals could have asserted the power to 
impose them even though no such power was explicitly conferred by their constituent 
instruments. Despite this possibility, no such measures were imposed by either ICT. 
 
																																																								
1 Charter of the International Military Tribunal (adopted 8 August 1945, entered into force 8 August 
1945) 82 UNTS 279 (IMT Charter) Art 28. 
2 For an argument in support of postponing restitution claims, see Stephen Weil, ‘The American Legal 
Response to the Problem of Holocaust Art’, (1999) 4 Art, Antiquity & Law 285, 287. 
3 IMT, Judgment of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal 1946 (1947) 41 American Journal of 
International Law 172 (IMT Judgment) 287. 
4 ibid, 332. Rosenberg was sentenced to death by hanging. 
5 Rebecca Young, ‘Fines and Forfeiture in International Criminal Justice’ in Róisín Mulgew and Denis 
Abels (eds) Research Handbook on the International Penal System (Edward Elgar 2016) 102, 103. 
6 IMT Charter (n 1) Art 27; Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (adopted 19 
January 1946, entered into force 19 January 1946) TIAS No 1589 (IMTFE Charter) Art 16. 
7 Young (n 5) 104. 
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Control Council Law No. 10, which was promulgated by the victorious Allied powers 
after World War II to enable the prosecution of those who were not in the category of 
major war criminals tried in the main proceedings at Nuremberg, contains more 
extensive fine and asset forfeiture procedures than those contained in the IMT Charter 
and IMTFE Charter.8 Under Article II(3) of Control Council Law No. 10, the tribunals 
established thereby were able to order the following punishments: 
 
(c) Fine […]. 
(d) Forfeiture of property. [and] 
(e) Restitution of property wrongfully acquired. 
(f) […] 
Any property declared to be forfeited or the restitution of which is ordered by 
the Tribunal shall be delivered to the Control Council for Germany, which shall 
decide on its disposal.9 
 
Notably, fine and forfeiture procedures are not listed in Control Council Law No. 10 as 
available ‘in addition to imprisonment’.10 Rather, these measures are listed as forms of 
punishment in their own right. Control Council Law No. 10 also provides for the first 
pre-conviction asset forfeiture procedures in the history of international criminal justice. 
At this time, however, there was no express provision that the forfeited assets were 
ultimately to be put to use for the benefit of victims. Article III(1) of Control Council 
Law No. 10 provides as follows: 
 
Each occupying authority, within its Zone of Occupation, 
 
(a) shall have the right to cause persons within such Zone suspected of having 
committed a crime […] to be arrested and shall take under control the property, 
real and personal, owned or controlled by the said persons, pending decisions 
as to its eventual disposition.11 
 
																																																								
8 Control Council Law No. 10 (adopted 20 December 1945, entered into force 20 December 1945) 3 
Official Gazette Control Council for Germany 50-55 (Control Council Law No. 10).  
9 Control Council Law No. 10 (n 8) Art II(3). 
10 cf IMT Charter (n 1) Art 28. 
11 Control Council Law No. 10 (n 8) Art III. 
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Turning to the case law, of the 142 convicted persons in the twelve trials carried out in 
the American zone of occupation, only the industrialist Alfred Krupp was ordered to 
forfeit property under Control Council Law No. 10.12 Moreover, the United States High 
Commissioner for Germany, John McCloy, later rescinded this forfeiture order,13 as 
recommended by the Advisory Board on Clemency for War Criminals.14  McCloy 
reasoned as follows: 
 
This is the sole case of confiscation decreed against any defendant by the 
Nuremberg courts. Even those guilty of personal participation in the most 
heinous crimes have not suffered confiscation of their property and I am 
disposed to feel that confiscation in this single case constitutes discrimination 
against this defendant unjustified by any considerations attaching peculiarly to 
him. General confiscation of property is not a usual element in our judicial 
system and is generally repugnant to American concepts of justice[.]15  
 
The reasons given by McCloy in support of his decision to rescind the forfeiture order 
against Krupp are unconvincing. As to his first ground, i.e. the discrimination between 
Krupp and other convicts, although ‘literally correct, […] it conveniently overlooked 
the difference between confiscating the property of an industrialist and confiscating the 
property of a soldier or government official.’16 As to the second ground provided by 
McCloy, Article II(3) of Control Council Law No. 10 explicitly allowed the tribunals 
to order the penalty of forfeiture. In addition, American law did not apply to the trials 
conducted under Control Council Law No. 10. As a result, according to Kevin Heller, 
McCloy’s invocation of American law “to trump a specific provision of Law No. 10 
was […] ultra vires.’17 
 
																																																								
12 US Military Tribunal Nuremberg, Judgment of 31 July 1948, in Trials of War Criminals Before the 
Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, Vol. IX, 1449-50. See also Kevin Jon 
Heller, The Nuremberg Military Tribunals and the Origins of International Criminal Law (Oxford 
University Press 2011) 313. 
13 McCloy had the power to do so having created the Advisory Board on Clemency for War Criminals, 
with the support of then Secretary of State, Dean Acheson. See Heller (n 12) 344, describing Acheson’s 
support as ‘reluctant’. 
14 See Landsberg: A Documentary Report (Office of the US High Commissioner for Germany 1951) 10. 
See also Heller (n 12) 355. 
15 ibid. 
16 Heller (n 12) 355. 
17 ibid. 
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The post-World War II military tribunals consequently did not lack the power under 
their constituent instruments to order fines and forfeiture measures. Nor, as Conor 
McCarthy has maintained, did those convicted under Control Council Law No. 10 want 
for wealth;18 indeed, several affluent industrialists and financiers were convicted of 
international crimes by the Control Council Law No. 10 tribunals.19 Instead, these 
tribunals either focused on sentencing convicted persons with the death penalty and 
periods of imprisonment or other interests prevailed, as in the case of the decision by 
John McCloy to revoke the forfeiture order issued against Alfred Krupp. Nonetheless, 
the inclusion of reasonably broad fine and asset forfeiture measures at this nascent stage 
of development of the project of international criminal justice is notable. 
 
3. The Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals 
 
After the Cold War, the UN Security Council (UNSC) established the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in response to the commission of mass atrocities in the 
former Yugoslavia20 and Rwanda,21 respectively. As for asset forfeiture procedures, 
Article 24(3) of the ICTY Statute permits the Trial Chamber, at the sentencing phase 
of proceedings, to order forfeiture of assets as follows:  
 
In addition to imprisonment, the Trial Chambers may order the return of any 
property and proceeds acquired by criminal conduct, including by means of 
duress, to their rightful owners.22 
 
Article 23(3) of the ICTR Statute is identical to Article 24(3) of the ICTY Statute.23 
The ad hoc tribunals were therefore empowered by their constituent instruments to 
order post-conviction forfeiture measures – but not fines – as a penalty additional to 
																																																								
18 Conor McCarthy, Reparations and Victim Support in the International Criminal Court (Cambridge 
University Press 2012) 44-45. 
19 ibid. 
20 See UNSC Res 827 (18 May 1993) UN Doc S/RES/827. 
21 See UNSC Res 955 (8 November 1994) UN Doc S/RES/955. 
22 Statute of the International Tribunal, UN Doc S/25704, Annex (ICTY Statute) Art 24(3). 
23 See Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, UNSC Res 955 (8 November 1994) UN Doc 
S/RES/1995, Annex (ICTR Statute) Art 23(3) (‘In addition to imprisonment, the Trial Chambers may 
order the return of any property and proceeds acquired by criminal conduct, including by means of 
duress, to their rightful owners.’) 
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imprisonment, similar to the powers afforded to the IMT.24 However, Rule 61 of the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTY and ICTR extends the power of Trial 
Chambers to order pre-conviction asset freezing measures more akin to those granted 
to the military tribunals established under Control Council Law No. 10: 
 
(D) […] Upon request by the Prosecutor or proprio motu, after having heard the 
Prosecutor, the Trial Chamber may order a State or States to adopt provisional 
measures to freeze the assets of the accused, without prejudice to the rights of 
third parties.25 
 
This Rule was implicated in 1999 in respect of former Serbian President, Slobodan 
Milošević, and his four co-accused – Milan Milutinović, Nikola Šainovic, Dragoljub 
Ojdanić, and Vlajko Stojiljković.26 In response to the application for the freezing of 
assets by the ICTY Prosecutor, Judge David Hunt ordered ‘all States Members of the 
United Nations [to] make inquiries to discover whether the accused (or any of them) 
have assets located in their territory and, if so, adopt provisional measures to freeze 
such assets, without prejudice to the rights of third parties, until the accused are taken 
into custody.’27 Shortly after Judge Hunt’s Decision, Switzerland took steps to freeze 
assets in the possession of Milošević and his co-accused located on its territory.28 
 
Ruling on two applications by African NGOs to appear as amicus curiae, ICTR trial 
chambers have confirmed that orders for restitution could only have been made if the 
accused person(s) had been charged with the unlawful taking of property. 29  No 
forfeiture order was granted by the ICTR. As for pre-conviction measures, in 1999, the 
																																																								
24 cf IMT Charter (n 1) Art 28. 
25 ICTY, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, as amended on 8 July 2015 (adopted 11 February 1994, 
entered into force 14 March 1994) UN Doc IT/32/Rev. 50 (ICTY RPE) Rule 61; ICTR, Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence, as amended on 13 May 2015 (adopted 29 June 1995, entered into force 29 June 
1995) UN Doc ITR/3/Rev.23 (ICTR RPE) Rule 61. 
26  ICTY, Prosecutor v Slobodan Milošević and others (Decision on Review of Indictment and 
Application for Consequential Orders) IT-02-54 (24 May 1999). 
27 ibid, para 38. 
28 See Décision de l’Office fédéral de la police dans l’affaire Milosevic Slobodan et autres (23 June 1999) 
<www.admin.ch/opc/fr/federal-gazette/1999/4796.pdf> accessed 1 May 2017. The freezing measures 
against Milošević’s assets were lifted following his death in March 2006. See McCarthy (n 18) 47. 
29 See ICTR, Prosecutor v Alfred Musema (Decision on an Application by African Concern for Leave to 
Appear as Amicus Curiae) ICTR-96-13-T (17 March 1999) paras 12-14; ICTR, Prosecutor v Théoneste 
Bagosora and others (Decision on Amicus Curiae Request by African Concern) ICTR-98-41-T (23 
March 2004) paras 5-11. 
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ICTR Prosecutor requested the French Ministry of Justice to freeze bank accounts in 
the name of Félicien Kabuga, 30  who is accused of genocide and crimes against 
humanity, but remains at large at the time of writing. The French authorities complied 
with the request,31 while the Prosecutor has also sought the cooperation of Kenya in 
adopting such measures against Kabuga.32 
 
The Statute of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (MICT) 
largely reverts to the approach of the ICTY and ICTR toward the forfeiture of assets 
(including protective measures).33 However, as the MICT was established to conduct 
some of the remaining tasks of the ICTY and ICTR at the time of their closure,34 its 
approach to forfeiture is arguably best regarded as a continuation of that adopted by its 
predecessors rather than a departure from the post-Rome Statute approach.  
 
The inclusion of asset forfeiture powers, including pre-conviction measures, in the legal 
frameworks of the two ad hoc tribunals created by the UNSC in the mid-1990s 
represents continuity in the approach adopted in the establishment of the post-World 
War II military tribunals. These powers were used more extensively by the ICTY and 
ICTR than their predecessors. At the same time, however, the ICTY and ICTR lacked 
the power to order fines and neglected to utilise the asset forfeiture measures at their 
disposal, despite clear indications that certain accused persons possessed property and 
proceeds susceptible to such measures. This underuse can be imputed, at least in part, 
to the absence of a holding related to the unlawful taking of property, as indicated in 
the decisions by ICTR trial chambers in Musema and Bagasora and others.   
 
																																																								
30 See ICTR, Miscellaneous–Kabuga Family (Appeal of the Family of Felicien Kabuga against Decisions 
of the Prosecutor and President of the Tribunal) 01-A (22 November 2002). 
31 ibid. 
32 See ‘Statement by Justice Hassan B. Jallow Prosecutor of the ICTR, to the UN Security Council’ (4 
June 2009) <http://ictr-archive09.library.cornell.edu/ENGLISH/speeches/jallow090604.html> accessed 
7 April 2017. 
33  Statute of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, UNSC Res 1966 (22 
December 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1966, Annex 1 (MICT Statute) Art 22(4); MICT, Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence, as amended on 26 September 2016 (adopted 8 June 2012, entered into force 8 June 2012) 
UN Doc MICT/1/Rev/2 (MICT RPE) Rule 63(D). 
34 UNSC Res 1966 (22 December 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1966, preamble (‘reaffirming the need to 
establish an ad hoc mechanism to carry out a number of essential functions of the Tribunals […] after 
the closure of the Tribunals’) (emphasis in original). 
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4. The Rome Statute System 
 
4.1 Fine and Forfeiture Measures 
 
The Rome Statute provides for the imposition of fines and forfeiture as penalties in 
addition to imprisonment. Under Article 77(2) of the Rome Statute: 
 
In addition to imprisonment, the Court may order: 
 
(a) A fine under the criteria provided for in the [RPE]; 
 
(b) A forfeiture of proceeds, property and assets derived directly or indirectly 
from that crime, without prejudice to the rights of bona fide third parties.35 
 
The Rome Statute definition of proceeds, property, and assets prone to forfeiture is 
noteworthy when compared with that employed at the ad hoc ICTs. In contrast to the 
terminology adopted in the Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR, ‘property and proceeds 
acquired by criminal conduct’,36 the ICC is also able to order forfeiture of proceeds, 
property, and assets derived indirectly from the Rome Statute crime(s) of which the 
convicted person is found guilty.37 According to Conor McCarthy: 
 
In sum, Article 77(2)(b) permits the Court to order the forfeiture of property 
obtained as part of the actus reus of the offence; property for the acquisition of 
which the crime was committed; property purchased with or pursuant to the sale 
of property directly deriving from the offence in one of the two foregoing ways; 
and profits from property obtained in any of these ways.38 
 
Moreover, the Court’s asset freezing powers are much wider than those afforded to 
earlier international criminal justice mechanisms. Pursuant to Article 93(1)(k) of the 
Rome Statute, the ICC can request States Parties to identify, trace, freeze, and seize 
																																																								
35 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 
2002) 2187 UNTS 90 (Rome Statute) Art 77(2). 
36 ICTY Statute (n 22) Art 24; ICTR Statute (n 23) Art 23. 
37 Rome Statute (n 35) Art 77(2)(b). 
38 McCarthy (n 18) 202. 
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assets, proceeds, property, and/or instrumentalities of crimes ‘in relation to 
investigations or prosecutions’.39 The Pre-Trial Chamber can request such measures, 
under Article 57(3)(e) of the Rome Statute, ‘after a warrant of arrest or a summons has 
been issued’.40 In other words, the ICC can request an asset freeze at the pre-trial phase 
of proceedings, before an accused person has been arrested. 
 
The first fines to be ordered by the Court were those against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 
a former Vice President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and his co-accused, 
Aimé Kilolo Musamba. Having been convicted by Trial Chamber VII of offences 
against the administration of justice, Bemba and Kilolo were fined 300,000 and 30,000 
Euros, respectively.41 
 
Given the relatively few cases to have reached the sentencing phase at the ICC,42 it is 
perhaps unsurprising that the Court had issued only two fines by late 2018 – and, 
moreover, in the context of proceedings concerning offences against the administration 
of justice, not international crimes. In the Bemba and others Sentencing Decision, Trial 
Chamber VII took into consideration not only ‘Bemba’s culpability’, but also his 
‘solvency’43. On the other hand, Trial Chamber III, in sentencing Bemba for crimes 
against humanity and war crimes, offences of which he was acquitted on appeal,44 did 
not order fine or forfeiture measures, ‘noting that the parties and Legal Representative 
																																																								
39 Rome Statute (n 35) Art 93(1)(k). 
40 Rome Statute (n 35) Art 57(3)(e). 
41 See ICC, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo and others (Decision on Sentence pursuant to 
Article 76 of the Statute) ICC-01/05-01/13-2123-Corr (22 March 2017) (Bemba and others Sentencing 
Decision) Disposition. The fines were confirmed in ICC, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo and 
others (Decision Re-sentencing Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Mr Aimé Kilolo Musamba and Mr Jean-
Jacques Mangenda Kabongo) ICC-01/05-01/13-2312 (17 September 2018) (Bemba and others Re-
sentencing Decision) Disposition. 
42 As of December 2018, the cases against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Germain Katanga, and Ahmad Al 
Faqi Al Mahdi are at the reparations phase. 
43 Bemba and others Sentencing Decision (n 41) para 261. 
44 The ICC Appeals Chamber acquitted Bemba of war crimes and crimes against humanity on 8 June 
2018, thereby vacating his sentence of imprisonment for these crimes. See ICC, Prosecutor v. Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo (Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber 
III’s “Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”) ICC-01/05-01/08-3636-Red (8 June 2018); ICC, 
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (Decision on the appeals of the Prosecutor and Mr Jean-Pierre 
Bemba Gombo against the decision of Trial Chamber III of 21 June 2016 entitled “Decision on Sentence 
pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute”) ICC-01/05-01/08-3637 (8 June 2018) para 8 (“As a result of the 
Appeal Judgment on Conviction, there is no basis for any sentence to be imposed on Mr Bemba in the 
present case and the Sentencing Decision therefore ceases to have effect.”). 
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do not request the imposition of a fine or order of forfeiture’.45 The lack of enthusiasm 
for the imposition of fines and asset forfeiture measures for international crimes seen 
in the practice of the ICTY, ICTR, and the post-World War II military tribunals appears 
to have resurfaced in the sentencing practice of the ICC, despite Bemba’s wealth. 
 
In the Bemba and others Sentencing Decision, the Trial Chamber observed that the 
contents of Bemba’s bank account had been transferred to the Court in order to meet 
his Defence expenses.46 In addition, in the Bemba and others Re-sentencing Decision, 
issued following a partially successful appeal by the Prosecutor against the original 
decision on sentencing handed down by Trial Chamber VII,47 the same Trial Chamber 
held that ‘Mr Bemba may use his frozen assets to pay his fine, and once it is paid the 
asset freezing order issued in this case ceases to have effect with respect to him.’48 Trial 
Chamber VII held similarly with respect to Kilolo’s frozen bank account.49 
 
Seized assets can thus be used to pay legal fees,50 but also, if a convicted person is not 
considered to be indigent, to provide reparations to victims, even if the conviction is 
for an offence against the administration of justice rather than an international crime. 
Indeed, one of the principal functions of the fines and forfeiture system in the Rome 
Statute is to serve as a mechanism facilitating the enforcement of reparation awards. 
This purpose is confirmed by Article 57(3)(e) of the Rome Statute, which provides that 
pre-trial protective measures requested by the Court for the purpose of eventual 
forfeiture are intended ‘in particular for the ultimate benefit of victims’.51 
 
																																																								
45 ICC, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the 
Statute) ICC-01/05-01/08-3399 (21 June 2016) para 95.  
46 Bemba and others Sentencing Decision (n 41) para 241. 
47 ICC, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo and others (Judgment on the appeals of the Prosecutor, 
Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Mr Fidèle Babala Wandu and Mr Narcisse Arido against the decision of 
Trial Chamber VII entitled “Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute”) ICC-01/05-
01/13-2276-Red (8 March 2018) paras 359, 361. See also Bemba and others Re-sentencing Decision (n 
41) para 3. 
48 Bemba and others Re-sentencing Decision (n 41) para 128. 
49 ibid, para 109. 
50 See Bemba and others Sentencing Decision (n 41) para 241. See also, generally, ICC, Prosecutor v. 
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (Decision on the Defence’s Application for Lifting the Seizure of Assets and 
Request for Cooperation to the Competent Authorities of Portugal) ICC-01/05-01/08-251-Anx (10 
October 2008); ICC, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (Decision on the Second Defence's 
Application for Lifting the Seizure of Assets and Request for Cooperation to the Competent Authorities 
of the Republic of Portugal) ICC-01/05-01/08-249 (14 November 2008). 
51 Rome Statute (n 35) Art 57(3)(e). 
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This is also evidenced by the Court’s case law. In its 2012 ‘Decision establishing the 
principles and procedures to be applied to reparations’, 52  the first decision on 
reparations issued by a Chamber of the ICC,53 Trial Chamber I expressed the following 
view: 
 
The Statute and [RPE] introduce a system of reparations that reflects a growing 
recognition in international criminal law that there is a need to go beyond the notion 
of punitive justice, towards a solution which is more inclusive, encourages 
participation and recognises the need to provide effective remedies for victims.54 
 
Further, in the Bemba and others Sentencing Decision, Trial Chamber VII ordered that 
the proceeds of the fines were to be transferred to the Court’s Trust Fund for Victims 
(TFV),55 which underscores the reparative nature of the Rome Statute.56 
 
4.2 Orders for Reparations 
 
If ultimately forfeited after conviction, Article 79 of the Rome Statute provides that 
assets collected through fines and forfeiture can be transferred to the TFV.57 Article 
75(2) of the Rome Statute further provides as follows: 
 
The Court may make an order directly against a convicted person specifying 
appropriate reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including restitution, 
compensation and rehabilitation. Where appropriate, the Court may order that 




52 ICC, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Decision Establishing the Principles and Procedures to be 
Applied to Reparations) ICC-01/04-01/06-2904 (7 August 2012) (Lubanga Reparations Decision). 
53 ibid, para 20. 
54 ibid, para 177, referring to UNGA ‘Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and 
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations 
of International Humanitarian Law’ UN Doc A/RES/60/147 (21 March 2006).  
55  Bemba and others Sentencing Decision (n 41) paras 199, 262. See also Bemba and others Re-
sentencing Decision (n 41) paras 109, 128. 
56 On reparative justice, see Conor McCarthy, ‘Reparations under the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court and Reparative Justice Theory’ (2009) 3 International Journal of Transitional Justice 250. 
57 Rome Statute (n 35) Art 79(2). 
58 ibid, Art 75. 
 12 
Again, as relatively few cases before the ICC have reached the reparations phase of 
proceedings,59 the Court has issued orders for reparations60 directly against convicted 
persons under Article 75(2) on only three occasions at the time of writing, in the cases 
against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Germain Katanga, and Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi. The 
first order for reparations issued by the ICC was directed against Thomas Lubanga on 
3 March 2015,61 without specifying his individual financial liability, which was later 
set at ten million US dollars.62 On 24 March 2017, Trial Chamber II issued an order for 
reparations against Germain Katanga, finding that, despite his indigence, he was liable 
for the sum of one million US dollars.63 Because of Katanga’s inability to pay, the Trial 
Chamber directed the TFV to consider using the resources at its disposal to implement 
the order.64 As for Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, Trial Chamber VIII issued a reparations 
order against him on 24 March 2017, setting his total individual financial liability at 2.7 
																																																								
59 See n 42. 
60 ICC Trial Chamber I established that ‘[r]eparations fulfil two main purposes that are enshrined in the 
Statute: they oblige those responsible for serious crimes to repair the harm they caused to the victims and 
they enable the Chamber to ensure that offenders account for their acts.’ Lubanga Reparations Decision 
(n 52) para 179. An ‘order for reparations’ gives effect to this procedure. 
61 ICC, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Order for Reparations) ICC-01/04-01/06-3129-AnxA (3 
March 2015). 
62 ICC, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Corrected version of the “Decision Setting the Size of 
the Reparations Award for which Thomas Lubanga Dyilo is Liable”) ICC-01/04-01/06-3379-Red-Corr-
tENG (21 December 2017). 
63 ICC, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga (Order for Reparations pursuant to Article 75 of the Statute) 
ICC-01/04-01/07-3728-tENG (24 March 2017) para 264. Although Katanga was found to be indigent, 
Trial Chamber II observed that, because of the potential future identification and freezing of his property 
and assets and the continued monitoring of his financial situation, ‘Katanga’s current financial situation 
cannot be regarded as material to the determination of the size of the reparations award for which he is 
liable’. ibid, para 246. See also ICC, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Judgment on the appeals 
against the “Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to reparations” of 7 August 
2012 with AMENDED order for reparations (Annex A) and public annexes 1 and 2) ICC-01/04-01/06-
3129 (3 March 2015) paras 102-105. 
64 ibid, para 342. The TFV is funded from four sources: ‘(a) Voluntary contributions from governments, 
international organizations, individuals, corporations and other entities, in accordance with relevant 
criteria adopted by the Assembly of States Parties; (b) Money and other property collected through fines 
or forfeiture transferred to the Trust Fund if ordered by the Court pursuant to article 79, paragraph 2, of 
the Rome Statute […]; (c) Resources collected through awards for reparations if ordered by the Court 
pursuant to rule 98 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence; [and] (d) Such resources, other than assessed 
contributions, as the Assembly of States Parties may decide to allocate to the Trust Fund.’ Regulations 
of the Trust Fund for Victims, ICC-ASP/4/Res.3 (3 December 2005) Regulation 21. According to Sara 
Kendall, compared with the Court’s four organs, the ‘material resources [of the TFV] are arguably the 
most tenuous given their voluntary nature, as the Fund relies heavily on annual pledges from interested 
states’. Sara Kendall, ‘Commodifying Global Justice: Economies of Accountability at the International 
Criminal Court’ (2015) 13 Journal of International Criminal Justice 113, 124. 
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million euros.65 Although the reparations order was partially amended by the Appeals 
Chamber in March 2018,66 the total amount remained undisturbed. 
 
The evident turn toward reparative justice in the Rome Statute has been attributed to a 
‘growing attention to victims within national criminal justice systems and […] a 
reaction to criticism of the manner in which victims’ concerns were considered by the 
ICTY and the ICTR’.67 Further, Shuichi Furuya points to the attention to victims in 
‘universal and regional human rights systems’.68 But this turn can also arguably be 
ascribed to a shift toward more inquisitorial proceedings – which generally provide for 
more extensive victim reparation (and participation) rights – on the international plane. 
Several ICTs, discussed in the following section, are based, at least partly, in national 
jurisdictions with civil law legal traditions. Such a development is likely to lead to a 
more prominent role for victims in proceedings in view of the more active participation 
of victims (or their legal representatives) in a number of civil law systems.69 
 
5. ICTs Established after the Adoption of the Rome Statute 
 
It is not the aim of this chapter to demonstrate uniformity in the approach of ICTs to 
the issue of fines and forfeiture; rather, it seeks to demonstrate that while most ICTs 
have been able to order such measures, they have been barely utilised in practice. This 
said, after the adoption of the Rome Statute, a more victim-oriented approach to asset 
forfeiture was followed in the legal instruments of number of ICTs.   
 
																																																								
65 ICC, Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi (Reparations Order) ICC-01/12-01/15-236 (17 August 
2017) para 134. 
66 ICC, Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi (Public redacted Judgment on the appeal of the victims 
against the “Reparations Order”) ICC-01/12-01/15-259-Red2 (8 March 2018). 
67  Christine Evans, The Right to Reparation in International Law for Victims of Armed Conflict 
(Cambridge University Press 2012) 87-88. See also Anne-Marie de Brouwer and Mikaela Heikkilä, 
‘Victim Issues: Participation, Protection, Reparation, and Assistance’ in Göran Sluiter and others (eds), 
International Criminal Procedure: Principles and Rules (Oxford University Press 2013) 1299, 1300. 
68 Furuya Shuichi, ‘Victim Participation, Reparations and Reintegration as Historical Building Blocks of 
International Criminal Law’ in Morten Bergsmo and others (eds), Historical Origins of International 
Criminal Law: Volume 4 (Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher 2015) 837, 839. 
69 See e.g. Charles P Trumbull IV, ‘The Victims of Victim Participation in International Criminal 
Proceedings’ (2008) 29 Michigan Journal of International Law 777, 778 (‘In these countries, the victim 
(or often the victim’s legal representative) can request investigatory measures, review the evidence 
against the accused, submit declarations, present evidence, cross-examine witnesses, and make closing 
arguments’); Salvatore Zappalà, ‘Comparative Models and the Enduring Relevance of the Accusatorial 
– Inquisitorial Dichotomy’ in Sluiter and others, International Criminal Procedure: Principles and Rules 
(n 67) 44, 51. 
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5.1 The Special Court for Sierra Leone 
 
There is no provision for fines in the governing documents of the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone (SCSL), which was established in 2002. However, Article 19(3) of the 
SCSL Statute provides for the forfeiture of assets as follows: 
 
In addition to imprisonment, the Trial Chamber may order the forfeiture of the 
property, proceeds and any assets acquired unlawfully or by criminal conduct, 
and their return to their rightful owner or to the State of Sierra Leone.70 
 
Rule 104 of the SCSL RPE also allowed the tribunal to order provisional measures as 
follows: 
 
(A) After a judgement of conviction […] the Trial Chamber, at the request of 
the Prosecutor or at its own initiative, may hold a special hearing to determine 
the matter of property forfeiture, including the proceeds thereof, and may in the 
meantime order such provisional measures for the preservation and protection 
of the property or proceeds as it considers appropriate. 
 
(B) The determination may extend to such property or proceeds, even in the 
hands of third parties not otherwise connected with the crime, for which the 
convicted person has been found guilty. […].71 
 
The limited SCSL case law on this issue, limited to one decision on a request for the 
freezing of bank accounts,72 demonstrates an approach akin to that at the ICTY and 
ICTR, requiring ‘clear and convincing evidence that the targeted assets have a nexus 
with criminal conduct or were otherwise illegally acquired.’73 The Prosecutor having 
																																																								
70 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (adopted 16 January 2002, entered into force on 12 April 
2002) 2178 UNTS 138 (SCSL Statute) Art 19.  
71 SCSL, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, as amended on 31 May 2012 (adopted 16 January 2002, 
entered into force 12 April 2002) (SCSL RPE) Rule 104. 
72 See SCSL, Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman and others (Norman – Decision on Inter Partes Motion 
by Prosecution to Freeze the Account of the Accused Sam Hinga Norman at Union Trust Bank (Sl) 
Limited or at Any Other Bank in Sierra Leone) SCSL-04-14-PT (19 April 2004). 
73 ibid, para 13. 
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failed, in the opinion of the Trial Chamber, to adduce sufficient evidence to establish 
this nexus,74 the motion to freeze the accounts of Sam Hinga Norman was rejected.75 
 
The SCSL did not impose asset forfeiture as a penalty against any convicted person, 
despite making several findings of guilt in respect of the war crime of pillage,76 a 
conspicuously profitable offence,77 and also hearing evidence that civilians were forced 
to mine diamonds.78 But bank accounts belonging to persons accused of crimes under 
the jurisdiction of the tribunal were frozen at the request of the SCSL. In 2003, 
Switzerland froze assets amounting to approximately two million Swiss francs in the 
name of former Liberian President, Charles Taylor, his relatives, members of his regime, 
and his company.79 However, in 2006, the SCSL Principal Defender determined Taylor 
to be “partially indigent”80 and no order for forfeiture was ultimately made against 
him.81 
 
Similar to the ad hoc ICTs, the SCSL does not allow for orders for reparations to be 
made directly against convicted persons. However, Rule 105 of the SCSL RPE does 
provide that victims of crimes for which persons were found guilty at the SCSL may 
attempt to seek compensation in a national court ‘or other competent body’.82 Rather 
than establishing reparation mechanisms similar to those in the Rome Statute, as will 
be further discussed below, the drafters of the constituent instruments of several ICTs 
preferred victims to claim reparations under the relevant provisions of national law. 
This might be indicative of another trend, namely that reparations procedures at ICTs 
have developed based on individual experience and that there is no single model. 
																																																								
74 ibid, para 16. 
75 ibid, para 18. 
76 See SCSL, Prosecutor v Issa Hassan Sesay and others (Judgement) SCSL-04-15-T (2 March 2009) 
(Sesay and others Judgment) paras 679 (in respect of Issa Hassan Sesay), 683 (in respect of Morris 
Kallon), 686 (in respect of Augustine Gbao). 
77 See Manuel Galvis Martínez, ‘Forfeiture of Assets at the International Criminal Court: The Short Arm 
of International Criminal Justice’ (2014) 12 Journal of International Criminal Justice 193, 199-201.  
78 See e.g. Sesay and others Judgment (n 76) paras 945, 1415, 1433. 
79  See Swiss Confederation, Federal Office of Justice, ‘Taylor’s accounts blocked as provisional 
measure: Legal assistance requested by Special Court for Sierra Leone’ (Press Release, Bern, 
Switzerland, 23 June 2013) <https://www.bj.admin.ch/bj/en/home/aktuell/news/2003/2003-06-
230.html> accessed 2 April 2017. 
80 SCSL, Prosecutor v Charles Ghankay Taylor (Principal Defender’s Determination of Mr. Charles 
Ghankay Taylor’s Indigence) SCSL-03-01-I-85 (3 April 2006). This was a provisional finding. 
81 See SCSL, Prosecutor v Charles Ghankay Taylor (Sentencing Judgement) SCSL-03-01-T (30 May 
2012). 
82 SCSL RPE (n 71) Rule 105.  
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5.2 The Special Panels for Serious Crimes 
 
The Special Panels for Serious Crimes (SPSC) in East Timor were empowered by their 
constituent instrument to impose fines and asset forfeiture measures against persons 
convicted of international and serious domestic offences falling under their jurisdiction. 
Section 10.1 of Regulation No. 2000/15 on the Establishment of Panels with Exclusive 
Jurisdiction over Serious Criminal Offences empowered the SPSC to impose the 
following penalties: 
 
(b) A fine up to a maximum of US$ 500,000. 
(c) A forfeiture of proceeds, property and assets derived directly or indirectly 
from the crime, without prejudice to the rights of bona fide third parties.83 
  
The UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), which promulgated the 
constituent instrument of the SPSC, also legislated for the possible formation of a Trust 
Fund. Section 25 of Regulation No. 2000/15 provides as follows: 
 
25.1 A Trust Fund may be established […] for the benefit of victims of crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the panels, and of the families of such victims. 
 
25.2 The panels may order money and other property collected through fines, 
forfeiture, foreign donors or other means to be transferred to the Trust Fund. 
 
25.3 The Trust Fund shall be managed according to criteria to be determined by 
an UNTAET directive.84 
 
This provision reflects Article 79 of the Rome Statute, which establishes the TFV.85 In 
practice, such a Trust Fund was never established by UNTAET.  
																																																								
83 Regulation No. 2000/15 on the Establishment of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction over Serious 
Criminal Offences (6 June 2008) UN Doc UNTAET/REG/2000/15 (Regulation 2000/15) Section 10. 
84 ibid, Section 25. 
85 Rome Statute (n 35) Art 79 (‘1. A Trust Fund shall be established by decision of the Assembly of 
States Parties for the benefit of victims of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, and of the families 
of such victims. 2. The Court may order money and other property collected through fines or forfeiture 
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5.3 The Iraqi High Tribunal 
 
The influence of the Rome Statute can also be seen in Article 24(f) of the Statute of the 
Iraqi High Tribunal (IHT), which was established under Iraqi law in 2005 to try Iraqi 
nationals and residents for international crimes and other violations of Iraqi law. Article 
24(f) of the IHT Statute provides as follows with regard to forfeiture: 
 
The Trial Chambers may order the forfeiture of proceeds, property or assets 
derived directly or indirectly from that crime, without prejudice to the rights of 
the bona fide third parties.86 
 
The IHT was not empowered by its constituent instrument or Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence to impose fines as a penalty or to order protective, pre-conviction measures. 
Additionally, similar to the approach at the ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL, the governing 
documents of the IHT do not allow orders for reparations to be made directly against 
convicted persons. Of course, each ICT does not, and is not expected to, replicate the 
institutional design of its predecessors. Where there are discrepancies, these can be 
attributed to various factors, including but not limited to the tribunal’s applicable law.  
 
5.4 The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
 
The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), established jointly 
by the UN and the Government of Cambodia, is also able to order forfeiture of assets 
as a penalty in addition to imprisonment, but cannot order fines. According to Article 
39 of the ECCC Law, one of the tribunal’s constituent instruments:87 
																																																								
to be transferred, by order of the Court, to the Trust Fund. 3. The Trust Fund shall be managed according 
to criteria to be determined by the Assembly of States Parties.’) 
86 Law of the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal (adopted 18 October 2005, entered into force 18 October 
2005) Official Gazette of the Republic of Iraq, No. 4006, 18 October 2005 (IHT Statute) Art 24(f). 
87 The ECCC were established jointly by the Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in 
the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic 
Kampuchea, with inclusion of amendments as promulgated on 27 October 2004, NS/RKM/1004/006 
(ECCC Law) and the Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia 
Concerning the Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of 
Democratic Kampuchea (adopted 6 June 2003, entered into force 29 April 2005) 2329 UNTS 117. The 
tribunal is governed by these documents and the ECCC, Internal Rules as amended on 16 January 2015 
(adopted 12 June 2007, entered into force 19 June 2007) (ECCC Internal Rules). See David Scheffer, 
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In addition to imprisonment, the Extraordinary Chamber of the trial court may 
order the confiscation of personal property, money, and real property acquired 
unlawfully or by criminal conduct. The confiscated property shall be returned 
to the State.88 
 
This resembles the approach in the constituent instruments of the ICTY, ICTR, and 
SCSL. At the time of writing, the ECCC has yet to order forfeiture as a penalty, 
although inquiries were made into the assets of KAING Guek Eav alias Duch,89 with 
the Trial Chamber ruling that no assets susceptible to forfeiture were identified.90 
 
In addition to allowing for the forfeiture of illicitly gained assets in this manner, the 
ECCC Internal Rules also provide for an extensive civil party participation – and, of 
particular note for purposes of the present chapter – reparations regime.91 According to 
this schema, civil parties can apply for ‘collective and moral reparations’, which may 
not consist of ‘monetary payments’.92 The ECCC, in part as a result of its civil law 
foundations,93 perhaps reflects more than any other tribunal the turn towards a more 
victim-centred internationalised criminal justice after the adoption of the Rome Statute.  
 
5.5 The Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
 
The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) is also rooted in the civil law tradition. Rule 
82 of the STL RPE provides as follows: 
 
(C) Upon request of the Prosecutor or the Registrar, or proprio motu after 
having heard the Defence, the Pre-Trial Judge or the Trial Chamber may request 
																																																								
‘The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia’ in M Cherif Bassiouni (ed) International 
Criminal Law Volume III: International Enforcement (3rd edn, Martinus Nijhoff 2008) 219, 239. 
88 ECCC Law (n 87) Art 39. 
89  ECCC, Co-Prosecutors v KAING Guek Eav alias Duch (Inquiry into income and assets of the 
Accused) E175 (15 October 2009). 
90 ECCC, Co-Prosecutors v KAING Guek Eav alias Duch (Judgement) E188 (26 July 2010). 
91 ECCC Internal Rules (n 87) Rule 23. 
92 ECCC Internal Rules (n 87) Rule 23 quinquies. 
93 The ECCC is housed in the Cambodian court structure and legal system. See Scheffer (n 87) 239. 
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a State or States to adopt provisional measures to freeze the assets of the accused, 
without prejudice to the rights of third parties.94 
 
Although the STL is not permitted to order fines and forfeiture of assets as penalties 
additional to imprisonment unlike the majority of ICTs, victims are able to apply to 
national courts or ‘other competent bod[ies]’ for compensation pursuant to Article 25 
STL Statute.95 This measure is similar to that in the SCSL RPE, according to which 
victims may, after a decision by the tribunal confirming the guilt of the accused, seek 
compensation in accordance with the relevant national procedures. The STL and SCSL 
therefore provide an avenue at the national level, at least in principle, through which 
victims might seek redress for international crimes. 
 
5.6 The Extraordinary African Chambers 
 
The Extraordinary African Chambers (EAC) were established by the African Union 
and the Republic of Senegal to try international crimes committed in Chad between 7 
June 1982 and 1 December 1990. The EAC are housed within the Senegalese court 
system, which, like the ECCC and STL, has its basis in the civil law legal tradition. 
 
The EAC is authorised to order fines in accordance with Senegalese law.96 Under 
Article 24(2) EAC Statute, the EAC is also able to order, as a penalty in addition to 
imprisonment, forfeiture of proceeds, property, and assets derived directly or indirectly 
from crime(s) for which a person is convicted.97 Moreover, according to Article 87 bis 
of the Senegalese Code of Criminal Procedure, the EAC may request protective, pre-
conviction measures in respect of the assets of an accused person.98 
																																																								
94 STL, Rules of Procedure and Evidence as amended on 3 April 2017 (adopted 20 March 2009, entered 
into force 20 March 2009) STL-BD-2009-01-Rev.8 (STL RPE) Rule 82. 
95 Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, UNSC Res 1757 (30 May 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1757, 
Annex (STL Statute) Art 25. 
96 Statut des Chambres africaines extraordinaires au sein des juridictions sénégalaises pour la poursuite 
des crimes internationaux commis au Tchad durant la période du 7 juin 1982 au 1er décembre 1990 
(Statute of the Extraordinary African Chambers within the courts of Senegal created to prosecute 
international crimes committed in Chad between 7 June 1982 and 1 December 1990) (adopted 30 January 
2013, entered into force 8 February 2013) (2013) 52 ILM 1028 (EAC Statute) Art 24(1). 
97 EAC Statute, Art 24(2). 
98 Code de Procédure Pénale Sénégalais (Senegalese Code of Criminal Procedure) Art 87 bis (‘Lorsqu’il 
est saisi d’un dossier d’information, le juge d’instruction peut d’office ou sur demande de la partie civile 
ou du ministère public, ordonner des mesures conservatoires sur les biens de l’inculpé.’) 
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As it concerns reparations measures, the EAC is able to order restitution, compensation, 
and rehabilitation under Article 27 of the EAC Statute.99 In regard to compensation, the 
EAC can request that such measures be implemented by a trust fund,100  which is 
established by Article 28 of the EAC Statute for the benefit of victims of the crimes 
within the tribunal’s jurisdiction as well as their beneficiaries.101 
 
Notably, however, the EAC Statute does not include provisions akin to Article 79(2) of 
the Rome Statute, which permits the ICC to order the transfer of the proceeds of fines 
and orders for forfeiture to the TFV, 102 or Article 44 of the KSC Law,103 which allows 
the KSC to request the sale of forfeited assets to fund reparation awards.104  
 
In the case against former President of Chad, Hissène Habré, the EAC did not order the 
forfeiture of assets or a fine as a penalty. A fine was not requested by the EAC’s 
Prosecutor and the EAC Trial Chamber rejected the Prosecutor’s request to impose 
asset forfeiture,105 despite assets belonging to Habré having been frozen earlier in the 
proceedings. The Trial Chamber held that the Prosecutor had failed to show that the 
assets resulted, directly or indirectly, from the commission of Habré’s crimes.106 The 
failure to charge Habré with the war crime of pillage – a potentially profitable offence 
– may have caused difficulties for the Prosecutor in meeting this forfeiture threshold, 
which closely resembles the Rome Statute.107 
 
The EAC also ordered significant reparations to Habré’s victims. The EAC Appeals 
Chamber set the total amount of reparations due at more than 82 billion CFA francs, 
																																																								
99 EAC Statute (n 96) Art 27(1). 
100 EAC Statute (n 96) Art 27(2). 
101 EAC Statute (n 96) Art 28(1). 
102 See Rome Statute (n 35) Art 79(2). 
103 Law on Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office (adopted 3 August 2015, entered into 
force 15 September 2015) Official Gazette of the Republic of Kosova, No. 27, 31 August 2015 (KSC 
Law). 
104 ibid, Art 44(6). 
105 Ministère Public c. Hissein Habré (Jugement) (30 May 2016) para 2329. 
106 ibid, para 2330. 
107 Rome Statute (n 35) Art 77(2)(b). On the failure of the EAC Prosecutor to charge Habré with pillage, 
see also Daley J Birkett, ‘Victims’ Justice? Reparations and Asset Forfeiture at the Extraordinary African 
Chambers’ Journal of African Law (forthcoming).  
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equivalent to over 140 million US Dollars, and ordered Habré to pay this sum.108 At the 
same time, the Appeals Chamber held that, at the time it issued its judgment, Habré’s 
assets were not sufficient to meet the totality of the reparations awarded.109 Although 
financing orders for reparations is – and will continue to be – undoubtedly challenging 
for ICTs in view of their limited resources and reliance on voluntary donations from 
States,110 the finding that Habré is individually liable for this amount of compensation, 
as with Germain Katanga at the ICC, is vital in recognising the harm suffered by the 
victims of the serious crimes for which these two men were convicted. 
 
5.7 The Kosovo Specialist Chambers 
 
The most recently established ICT, the Kosovo Specialist Chambers (KSC), adopts an 
approach to fines, asset forfeiture, and orders for reparations similar to that in the Rome 
Statute. The KSC are permitted to order forfeiture of assets as a penalty and orders for 
reparations under Article 44 of the KSC Law, as follows: 
 
6. In addition to imprisonment, the Specialist Chambers may order only the 
convicted person to make restitution or pay compensation to a Victim or to 
Victims collectively, or may order the forfeiture of property, proceeds and any 
assets used for or deriving from the commission of the crime and their return to 
their rightful owner or sale and share between Victims under Article 22 (“a 
Reparation Order”).111 
 
Turning to fines, the KSC Law does not allow for their imposition for international 
crimes.112 However, the KSC can order such measures for the failure to comply with 
witness summonses. Under Article 42 of the KSC Law, failure to appear and refusal to 
testify as a witness, respectively, are punishable by a fine of up to 250 Euros.113 
 
																																																								
108 Le Procureur Général c. Hissein Habré (Arrêt) (27 April 2017) 226. The exact figure was 82 billion 
and 290 million CFA francs. 
109 ibid, 226. 
110 On which, see Nader Iskandar Diab “Challenges in the Implementation of the Reparation Award 
against Hissein Habré: Can the Spell of Unenforceable Awards across the Globe be Broken?” (2018) 16 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 141. 
111 KSC Law (n 103) Art 44. 
112 This approach is similar to that adopted at the MICT. See MICT Statute (n 33) Art 22(1). 
113 KSC Law (n 103) Art 42. 
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As for protective measures, Article 39 of the KSC Law provides as follows: 
 
11. The Pre-Trial Judge may, where necessary, provide for the protection and 
privacy of victims and witnesses, the preservation of evidence, the protection of 
persons and national security information or the preservation of assets which 
may be subject to a forfeiture under this Law and the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence, including temporary freezing orders, temporary confiscation orders 
or other temporary measures.114 
 
This victim-oriented provision provides the Pre-Trial Judge of the KSC with similar 
powers to those available to Pre-Trial Chambers at the ICC under the Rome Statute. 
Likewise, Article 53(1)(l) of the KSC Law, which concerns cooperation and judicial 
assistance, is similar to Article 93(1)(k) of the Rome Statute: 
 
1. Subject to the rights of the accused provided for in Article 21, all entities and 
persons in Kosovo shall co-operate with the Specialist Chambers and Specialist 
Prosecutor’s Office and shall comply without undue delay with any request for 
assistance or an order or decision issued by Specialist Chambers or Specialist 
Prosecutor’s Office, including, but not limited to, those concerning: […] 
l. the identification, tracing and freezing or seizure of proceeds, property and 
assets or instrumentalities of crimes for the purpose of eventual forfeiture, 
without prejudice to the rights of bona fide third parties[.]115 
 
Matthew Cross identifies a subtle difference between the Rome Statute asset freezing 
regime and that embraced by the drafters of the KSC Law.116 Cross contends that the 
wording of the latter, ‘proceeds, property and assets or instrumentalities of crimes’,117 
instead of ‘assets and instrumentalities of crimes’ found in the Rome Statute,118 ‘may 
broaden the scope of the assets which may be frozen prior to trial’.119 
 
																																																								
114 KSC Law (n 103) Art 39. 
115 KSC Law (n 103) Art 53(1)(l). 
116 Matthew E Cross, ‘Equipping the Specialist Chambers of Kosovo to Try Transnational Crimes: 
Remarks on Independence and Cooperation’ (2016) 14 Journal of International Criminal Justice 73, 92. 
117 KSC Law (n 103) Art 53(1)(l) (emphasis added).  
118 Rome Statute (n 35) Art 93(1)(k). 
119 Cross (n 116) 92. 
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In sum, therefore, the KSC have at their disposal a victim-oriented asset freezing and 
forfeiture regime akin to the Rome Statute system. The KSC are empowered to order 
both pre- and post-conviction measures to freeze the assets of accused and convicted 
persons, respectively. Such assets may subsequently be used to provide reparations to 
victims. That the drafters of the KSC Law included such a regime demonstrates that 
reparation is viewed as a vital component of the institution’s restorative mandate. 
 
6. Some Suggested Reasons behind ICTs’ Failure to Order Asset Recovery 
Measures  
 
It has thus far been demonstrated that, although a number of ICTs have been invested 
with the power to order fines, forfeiture of property, proceeds of crimes and/or assets, 
and, more recently, to orders reparations against convicted persons, these powers have 
barely been invoked in practice. A key question is therefore why ICTs have appeared 
to be reluctant to employ the asset recovery tools at their disposal. Three options will 
be presented in turn. 
 
6.1 Theoretical Basis 
 
First, the caution on the part of those ICTs empowered to do so to order fines or asset 
forfeiture measures could arguably be attributable, at least in part, to the grave nature 
of international crimes. In other words, penalties of a financial corrective nature could 
seem ill-fitting when imposed for the commission of, in the words of the preamble to 
the Rome Statute, “the most serious crimes of concern to the international community 
as a whole”.120 This can be contrasted with orders for reparations, which appear to be 
more readily used by ICTs than fines and forfeiture measures. It is suggested that the 
former, which find their basis in the law of civil responsibility, do not suffer from this 
perception. It therefore seems reasonable to assume that the ICC, and other ICTs with 
the capacity to order reparations directly against convicted persons, will employ such 
powers more readily that fines and forfeiture measures for this reason. Indeed, such a 
willingness to issue reparations orders is already borne out in the early practice of the 
																																																								
120 Rome Statute (n 35) preambular para 4. 
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ICC, which has found that all three individuals guilty of crimes under its jurisdiction 
are also liable to make reparations pursuant to Article 75 of the Rome Statute. 
 
6.2 Dearth of Assets 
 
A second possible reason behind ICTs’ reluctance to make use of fines and forfeiture 
measures is practical: despite certain persons convicted of international crimes having 
(had) access to substantial assets, ICTs have struggled to have them traced and frozen. 
For example, although Charles Taylor and Hissène Habré were reported to have held 
vast sums of money and other assets accumulated during their presidencies of Liberia 
and Chad, respectively, investigators have not been able to identify, trace, seize, and 
freeze them. This could be because the assets have been located beyond the reach of 
financial investigators by the suspect (or, depending on the phase of the proceedings, 
accused person or convicted person) or their ownership disguised. 
 
At the other end of the financial spectrum, it must be acknowledged that many of the 
persons convicted of international crimes are indigent, meaning that they do not have 
sufficient assets to fund their defence. When faced with this reality, coupled with the 
frequently high number of victims potentially eligible for reparations in international 
crimes cases, the limited use by ICTs of fines and forfeiture measures, with a view to 
using their proceeds to fund reparation awards, appears rather more justifiable. 
 
6.3 Other Reparations Paradigms 
 
Although not necessarily a reason behind the lack of enthusiasm shown by a series of 
ICTs for the imposition of fines and forfeiture measures for the commission of crimes 
under their jurisdiction, the availability and use of other reparations paradigms ought 
to be taken into account. For example, it was noted above that only one order for 
forfeiture of assets, against industrialist Alfred Krupp, was made by the post-World 
War II military tribunals. It was also observed that the constituent instrument of the 
IMT, as well as Control Council Law No. 10, failed to provide for the imposition of 
measures akin to orders for reparations. However, although reparations were not 
awarded in the course of the criminal proceedings before ICTs, this does not mean that 
victims received no reparations whatsoever for harm suffered. Indeed, post-World War 
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II West Germany developed a reparations programme as a political-administrative tool 
complementing the criminal process. The measures sought, inter alia, to address the 
responsibility of the German State to individual victims, as opposed to intra-State 
reparations, although the latter were also paid.121 Through a series of federal reparations 
laws,122 Germany aimed to indemnify victims of persecution suffered under the Nazi 
regime.123 
 
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss the advantages of different reparations 
models, within and beyond the criminal process, in respect of the extent to which they 
meet the need to make restitution to (groups of) victims of war. Nonetheless, it is worth 
noting that paradigms akin to the foregoing German national reparations scheme, as a 
political-administrative mechanism designed to complement the criminal process, 
could function alongside reparations under the ICC system, but only where there is 
State involvement in the commission of offences, as was the case with Nazi Germany. 
These mechanisms are therefore limited and operate to meet the responsibility of the 
State, as opposed to that of individuals, i.e. convicted persons in the ICC system, to 
make reparations to individual (or groups of) victims. Fines, asset forfeiture, and 
particularly orders for reparations consequently retain an important role in funding 




This chapter has sought to demonstrate, first, that most ICTs have been permitted by 
their constituent instruments to order fines, forfeiture of assets (including protective 
measures for the purpose of eventual forfeiture), and/or reparations directly against 
convicted persons. However, despite possessing these powers, and despite evidence 
that a number of persons found guilty of international crimes had significant wealth, 
																																																								
121 See Ariel Colonomos and Andrea Armstrong, ‘German Reparations to Jews after World War II: A 
Turning Point in the History of Reparations’ in Pablo de Greiff (ed), The Handbook of Reparations 
(Oxford University Press 2006) 390, 391. 
122 This series of laws began with the Federal Supplementary Law for the Compensation of Victims of 
National Socialist Persecution of 18 September 1953 (Bundesergänzungsgesetz zur Entschädigung für 
Opfer der nationalsozialistischen Verfolgung (BEG) vom 18. September 1953), which was subsequently 
modified, most pertinently for the purposes of the present chapter, on 29 June 1956 (amending, inter 
alia, residency and deadline requirements) and 14 September 1965 (amending, inter alia, requirements 
relating to the burden of proof and eligibility). See Colonomos and Armstrong (n 121) 402-408. 
123 See Colonomos and Armstrong (n 121) 402-408. 
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ICTs have seldom invoked such measures in proceedings other than those involving 
offences against the administration of justice. In addition, the chapter has also aimed to 
show that the inclusion in the Rome Statute of more victim-centred procedures in 
respect of fines and forfeiture, targeted at the provision of reparations, has led to the 
adoption of similar measures in the law (if not the practice) of certain subsequently-
established ICTs. 
 
In order to recover the proceeds of international crimes, and to finance reparations to 
the victims of such atrocities, ICTs’ prosecutors could more readily utilise fines and 
forfeiture measures. This approach could be especially advantageous in cases where 
convicted persons (or, in respect of protective, pre-conviction, measures with a view to 
forfeiture, accused persons) have access to substantial assets. The adoption of an 
extensive reparations system in the Rome Statute demonstrates a turn toward a more 
reparative international criminal justice, which is also reflected in the law governing a 
number of ICTs established after 1998. Most ICTs have at their disposal at least some 
tools with which they are able to locate and recover assets belonging to those (accused 
or) convicted of international crimes. Not least to secure the funds required to finance 
awards for reparations, prosecutors at ICTs could devote greater attention to these tools, 
for which procedural structures are largely already in place. 
